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HANSON LAND AND LIVESTOCK
COMPANY,
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BRIEF OF

RF~SPONDENTS

8TATF.MENT OF THE CASE
This case involves joint appeals by appellants Pearl
0. YoorhN 8 ano Hanson Land and Livestock Company
from two juognwnts of partial distribution of certain
property in the P~tate of Hillard L. Yoorhees, Deceased.
In addition, app1>1lant Pearl O. Voorhees seeks to appeal
from a judgmPnt rendered on October 2, 1959, in the
P~tate of Hillard L. 'roorltet>s, Deceased, and in the civil
1

2
action, wherein Betty Ha~'ward and Bev<~rly Clyt] 1•
appeared as plaintiffs and Pearl 0. Voorhees aµpear~J
as defendant, th<~ same being Civil No. 4 78+. This latter
judgment was entered by the District Court of Sanpete
County in both the probate and civil matters, which harl
been combint>d for the purpose of hearing at that tirnP.

Respondents desire to make their own statement of
the facts antedating and giving rise to this appeal ~o
that the Court will have their version, as well as the
version of Appellants. For convenience in referring to
the parties, Appellant Pearl 0. Voorhees will be referred to as Appellant or Appellant Voorhees while
Appellant Hanson Land arnl Livestock Company will bi,
referred to by its name or as Appellant Hanson.
The Record in the Probate Pro<'eedings which i'
rontained in three separate volm1ws will he referred to
by page number, as will tlw Record in the <'ivil action.
Transcript or Deposition references will be the same as
those used by Appellants.
It is to be noted that \Valker Bank and Trust Corn
pany, Administrator of the l~state of Hillard L. Yoorhees, deceased, is not an appellant in this matter.
However, Hanson Land and Livestock is more than a
mere .. intervenor" in this ease. rn1is appeal question~
the action of the lower court in refusing to confirm il
sale of certain real propert~, and grazing rights to ,.\ppellant Company and in onh•ring partial distributioH

'J

,)

tlwrrof to tliP l1Pi rs .. \dually. Appellant Voorhees is only
nnininall~- inten•-;h·rl in sePking to help Appellant Han~on gel the Jll'opert~-. a...: the facts hereinafter related

\iii! morP

fnll~·

dis<•lose.

Little neP<l lw said concerning the background of the
,.n~r prior to thP de<·ision of this court in an earlier
appeal (Tn thP Matter of the Estate of Hillard L. VoorhPrs, deceased, (Decembl•r 4, 1958) 8 Ut. 2d 231, 332 P2d
fi/O). (R. 207 -208). Tn its decision in that case this court
onlerPd that Walker Bank and Trust Company be appointed Administrator of the Estate of Hillard L. Voorlwss, dPeeased. 1t further withdrew its Alternative Writ
of Prohibition in connedion with the civil action filed
111 RPspondP11ts against Appellant Voorhees to require
lier to account for substantial property which Responrlrnts claimed belonged in the Estate of their father
Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased. (R. 204). In its opinion
the court Haid ''thP heirs can themselves sue for the reroYery to the el':ltate of any property belonging to the
drcedent". (R. ~07-208).
Thereafter Respondc>nh; continued with the prosenntion of the civil action in the District Court of Sanpete
County against Appellant Voorhees to require her to
turn into tlu• estate the real and personal property which
Rr:.;pondentH elairned belonged to their father at the time
of his death. Prior to the time of trial the depositions of
all parties were taken including the deposition of AppPllant "'''oor11e0:-;.
, . ]·n the Brief
· of Appellant Voorhees
ref Pren ce i:-;
· Illa dP to :-;mne of these depositions as though
tl11· tr:;;f1111
· is
· not the case. Nor
·' · on.'· WC'rP l!Jl(i·isputed. This

4

do Respondents conce<le that the t<>stiiuony of Mr~. y 0111
hees i11 the hearings of Odo her 21st and December l!lt11.
195i, is correct. Such testimo11~· wa::-; givPn in a prlWP~d
ing authorized hy Rec. 75-11-18, FCA 1953, where a per.
son suspected of having \\Tongful possession of am
property of the decedent may he required to submit 1~1
interrogation with respect thereto. In surh testimoni
Appellant Voorhees among other things admitted th~t
she had signed decedent's name on certain document<
(Tr. Oct. 21, p. 62). Similarly, in the same hearing, Mrs.
Voorhees fostified that subsequent to the execution of
certain Deeds by .Mr. Voorhees to her, she and Mr. Voor.
hees executed deeds to the same property to the girls.
(Tr. Oct. 21, p. 60).
Respondents have always maintained there was no
delivery of any of these deeds. In fact, in their depositions which are quoted from on other matters by Ap.
pellant Voorhees, RespondPnts both testified that they
had received letters from Appellant Voorhees stating
she had recorded the deeds hut that "I feel like a thief
because if and when your father finds out all I can do ii
tell him that he has threatened suicide and that I had
to pro tect myself." (Deposition of Bett~· Hayward P· jil.
See, also, deposition of Beverly Cl~·de p. 12).
1

The civil action between RN;pondents and Appellant
Voorhees came on for trial on April 1, 1959. In preparation for the trial Respondents had obtained the serVJ1' 1"
of an examiner of questioned doemnents h~· the name of
Harris, who at consi<lPrable cost and Pxprnse to RP·
spondents had made a stud~· of signatures of the decedent

5
r<>:-:ped to various do<'UlllPnts which Appellant Voorit('P'> claimed involvl•d transfer of a:-;sets prior to his
df'ath. ~Ir. Harris was l"w;ent in Manti to testify on
lwhalf of Responclf'nt:;.: with respect to such signatures.
Previousl~, Mrs. \'oorhees in her deposition had been
Pxamined (•oncerning some of these questioned documents
arnl had failed 1o state specifically whether the signature
appearing on tlH' docnrnent was that of her husband or
1rhether it might have lwen signed by someone else.
111

Before the Court convened counsel for the respectiw parties had a discussion concerning the possibility
of settlement so that the court was asked to give the
partie somP tirne to see if a settlement could be worked
out. ('J1r. April 1, p. 1 ) . 'The court granted a recess until
~ :00 p.m. that afternoon. During the interim counsel and
fop parties were able to effectuate a settlement of the
ea:-:e, which settl1:•ment was incorporated in the terms of
a l\femorandurn of TTnderstanding (Exh. 1) which was
t)'}led on the spot and read by and signed by all of the
partie8, with eertain eorrections made at the time of
:-:igning by Appellant Yoorhees. As stated by Mr. Nielsen
at that time:
Becau8e it is contemplated that this written
~Iemorandurn of Understanding will be formafowcl in a writt<'n Stipulation, we would prefer
not to filP it \\'itlt the court but would he happy to
furni~:il1 tht• Court with a copy for his examination,
hut in accordance with that written Understanding it is stipulated between the parties that
pending tlie Pxecution of the final formal
Stipulation an Entry of ,Judgment therein, that
the presPnt aetion will he continued without date
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subject to being called up by either party should
any question arise as to the interpretation of thr
Memorandum of lTnderstanding now entered int 11
or in connection with the accounting of the property which is agreed will he done hy l\f rs. Voorhe"s''
(Tr. April 1, p. 1,2)
The Memorandum of the Understanding, after conceding certain property to AppPllant Voorhees, provide 8 :
"7. The balance of all property, including
the furniture and furnishings at Manti, including
any increment or income therefrom, not includr<l
in or used to acquire the property described in
· paragraphs one to four inclusive, and owned or
acquired by Hillard L. Yoorhees, shall he included in his estate".
The .Memorandum of Understanding went on to state
that where Mrs. Voorhees hacl purported to sell some
property while the title remaiiwd i11 her name that the
proceeds from the sale would he accepted in lieu of the
property, except in the instanee of the real estate contract dated the ________ day of Octoher, 1958, which had been
entered into between Mrs. Voorhees and Appellant Company.
The Memorandum of Understanding further provides that Appellant Y oorhees would make an accounting
to the court and would "immediately upon the execution
(;~ tlfr~ Understanding" deposit with the Walker Bank
and Trust Company "all property now in her possession.
including hank accounts or bank deposit books, stock,,
bonds or other securities; and shall, as soon as possible.
prepare and submit a (letailed accounting in respect tn

7
rf'<'Pipt.- and di~hun-;ernt•nt:-; since the death of Hillard
L. \'oorhPPS and al:-:u a<'<'Onnt for mone~'s received by her

lier

<hiring his last illne~::-;".
Within two wePk after the settlement of the civil
aetion hetwPPn thP Rt>spondents and Appellant Voorhees,
;\ppPllant llnn~on Land arnl Livestock Company filed a
Petition in tltt> Prohat<· matter setting forth that Appellant Voorhet>s had t>ntered into a contract with Hanson
L:md and Livestoek; that "said contract also recited that
!he buyer and sellc->r ('ach understood that the property
descrihPd in both Pareels A and B could be decreed to
hP estate lanrls b~, a C'ourt in the then pending litigation";
tl1at "petitionpr therefore has a direct legal interest in
and to whatPvPr titlf. in said lands vested in Pearl 0.
Yoorhees upon thP death of her husband Hillard L.
\'oorhees, and tl1at she eannot waive or relinquish any
snrh title in viPw of said contract without the approval
of petitioner''; (H. 2fl.t) and asked the Court for an order
authorizing Ham;on Land and Livestock to be given
notice of further proceedings in the probate matter.
rn. 253-255). In ronnection therewith, the parties, in1.Jnding Respondents herein, signed a stipulation agreeing that Hanson Land and Livestock Company would
thereafter be entitled to notice of "any proposed orders
of any petition whirh might be filed in the above entitled
al'!ion, which 01·der or petition affects in any manner
the rig-ht, tit IP, anrl interest of Petitioner in and to the
lanl1s whirl1 are thp snhject of the contract dated the 21st
nf Oetoher, 19~8 b~, and hetween Mrs. Pearl 0. Voorhees,
a_ wi<low, and H an:-;on Land and Livestock Company, a
l lah C'orporatinn, a ('Op~· of which contract is attached
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to and included as a part of Petitioner's Petition hPr"
in". ( R. 261). Based upon such stipulation thP roun
entered an order stating that the Appellant Hanson
should be given notice of any such proposed order~ of
P€'titions. ( R. 262-264). And the reeord diseloseR that
Appellant Hanson has had notice of all subsequent
matters in the prohate proeeeding-.
The next matter of :-;ignificance appt>aring in the
probate file is the notice given hy eounsel for Respolldents that the Respondents would call up for hearing
and dispm;ition h~, the court "the first an<l final account
of the said Pearl 0. Y oorhees as administratrix of the
estate of Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased, heretofore file<l
herein, together with the objections thereto filed by the
said Betty Hay\\'ard and Beverly Clyde." (R. 273). Thi>
notice was served upon counsel for ~\ppellant Hanson a<
well as for counsel of the other parties involved. (R. 2Hl.
While the former appeal to this court in the matter
of the estate of Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased, hereinabove referred to was still pending, Appellant YoorheP'
filed in probate what was designated as "First Report
and Account of Administratrix and Petition for Approval of the same". (R. 125-136). Thereafter, Respondents filed written Objections to the report and account
in which it was alleged that Appellant Yoorhees, in
addition to the items reported h~· her in the account, ha~
"considerably more cash, real property, and persona!
property lwlonging to said estat<> and for which she hai
failed to a<'c<rnnt. At th<> tillw of Iii~ <l~ath said decedent
owrn'd <'On~iderahle rPal JH'OJWrty Jocat<>(l in Sanpete

9
:rnd ;-;t·Yi('l' Co lint iP..- ... ( )bjectors allege that said ad1ni11istratrix :·dionld hc• n·quire<l to appear and show
(·:rnse, if a11> slie ltas, why said property and assets de"nh0<l in the pr<-'t·1•fling paragraph:.; are not accounted for
Jiy l1ei- and rtiported as assets of the decedent." (R. 161J()'.2).

This Petition was not !ward until after the settle1nPnt of th<· f'ivil adion and after Appellant Hanson had
ohtainerl an ordPr from the court authorizing it to interYtine in all subsequent proeeedings affecting the title to
thP real estat(• and requiring notice of such proceedings
in he sf'rved upon it. Therefore, when notice was given
Ii.' Respondents that the Petition, above referred to of
)q1pdlant YoorlH•es, \\·ould he called up for hearing and
ili~.position, along with the objections filed thereto, ApJlPllant Hanson was put on notice of the fact that the
<'nnrt \\'onld he f'alled upon to pass on the question
whether ~ai(l rE>al property should be a part of the Estate.
A1ipellant Hanson Land and Livestock Company
IPceived notice of t11e hearing of this Petition, which
wa:-; set for August iH, 1959. No objections were ever
filPd to this petition or accounting by Appellant Hanson.
In thP meanti111P, a liParina
of a Motion by
Respondents
I"'>
•

iii t hr civil ad ion to have jn<lg·rnent directing Appellant
\"oorhees to dt>t•d said propert~· to the estate had been

~' t for An!.!,·u:-:.t ~9, 1!l:-i~). Although Appellant Hanson was
ilof

a part:· to tlir• eivil adion, in the Brief of Appellant

\'norliPf·:-: (p.

'~lit i,..;

:-:tat("l

tlwton August 29th Appellant
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Hanson "appeared because it had heard of the 1·epudiation of the October contract."
As indicated above, in l\Iay of 1959, Respondents
had filed a Motion in the civil action requesting the
court to enter judgment on the stipulation "directing
that all property, both real and personal, owned \1)
Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased during his lifetime belong~
to and forms a part of his estate and directing and requiring said Defendant to execute and deliver to the sai<l
'\Valker Bank and Trust Company, as administrator, a
Deed to all real property owned by decedent during his
lifetime." (Civil R. 21). This Motion was thereafter
amended to describe more specifically the property ref erred to (Civil R. 24).
The hearing on this ~fotion was commenced on
August 29, 1959, at which it appears Appellant Hanson
was represented but did not parti<>ipate. At the beginning
of the hearing counsel for Appellant Voorhees advised
the Court that "this matter ought to he set down for a
day certain for an accounting on the whole thing."
this

"THE COURT:

The probate matter aml

one~

"MR. CHRISTF~NSON: Yes, the proba!t
matter and this matter ::it one time." (Tr. Aug.~~
p. 13,14)
After some discussion between court and counsel i!
was agreed to, the court indieating it would hear parl
of the tesfonony that day. (Tr. Aug. 29, p. 16)

11
Aftrr lwari11g ;-;owP ol' the evidence the matter was
l·ontinued to ~(·ph·mhPr 1G. l9:S9 and consolidated with
ilw probate action. ( l\linutP f'ntries dated August 29, 1959
and An~n~t :-n. 1%!) in hoth rivil and probate proceedin~~).

Tl1r <lHY hl'f•ll'P tltt-> hearing on the continued matter
\piwllant Yoorla•ei:-; filed an Amendment and Supplement to hH fi rRt and final report which was signed by
:i,.:· arnl notariied, and which set forth the following:

":2. Pursuant to Memorandum of Understanding executf'(l April 1, 1959, in the case of
Betty Ha>'Ward, et. al., plaintiffs, vs. Pearl 0.
Voorhees, DPfendant, No. 4,784, of the files and
recoro;;; of the District Court of Sanpete County,
Utah, it wa:-< agrPPd that all property of Hillard
L. Y oorlwes exrept a certain joint bank account,
a certain eontract with Freed Corporation and
r-ertain life insurance proceeds, the sole property
of Petitionf'r, and except that amount used to
acquire the residence at 3856 South 2140 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah, and to landscape and furnish ;;;aid residenee, be included in said estate."
In paragraph 3 the "mountain ground located in
:-lpvirr County" wa~ spPrifically identified as part of
this propert>' (although the Petition asserted it was to
t)f• subject to tltp rontrad with Appellant Hanson which
\1as not tlw fad).
f n eO!llH'dion with this ~mpplemental Petition, ApJlf•llant VoorliPPs filed lwr account showing what credits
and offset:s sliP «!aimed to he entitled to. (R. 278-281).
I '!'he

l'l'('ord dot•:-; not diselose whether Appellant Han~('11 marlp an appparanee at this hearing).
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At the conelusion of the evidt>JH'P, thP <·omt apprn·,·,
and :-;ettle<l the account of the AppeJlant YoorhPes 11 ,11
rertain exceptions and <lirected and enterrd judg1111 •111
that said Appdlant Voorhees deliver to Walker Bank
and Trust Company various items of personal pro 1wrh
and "a W'arranty Deed to that eertain real propPlt)
located in Saniwte County, Ftah, known as the 'farn1'
and that certain real property loeated in Nevier County.
lTtah, known as the 'moutain ground'''. (Minute enln
dated September 15, 1959 in hoth civil and probalP
Record)
rrhereafter, formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and ,J u<lgment were prepared hy Appell~nt
Yoorhees' eounsel and submittPd to the Court and signerl
by the eourt as of Oetober 2, Hl59. (This judgment lihwise directs that Pearl 0. Voorlt('es execute and deliver
a \Varranty Deed to the Administrator of the rstatP
covering the real property in question). \Vi thin a few
days thereafter, and in satisfaction of the judgment entered hy the Court on October 2, 1959, Appellant Voorhee.exPented and delivered to the \V alkPr Bank and Trn~I
Company as administrator of the estate of Hillard L.
Voorhees, deceased, vVananty Deeds to the property in
question. These deeds to the lands in question were
voluntaril>T executed and delivered hy l\lrs. Voorhees to
the A•lministrator shortlv after in the presence of her
<'ounsf•l and counsel for Hespondents and they containeil
' th
no reservations of any kind whatsoPver. Trnme dia e·
thereafter the Administrator had said deeds recorded
of record.
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appt·al "11...; takPH fro111 the judgment of the court
.·nl!·rrd in hotl1 tl11· •·ivil and probate matters on October
:~. 1~ft9. h~· AppPllant H:rnr-:on. Nor was any appeal ever
tnhn or attP111ptt·d to he• takPn by Appellant Voorhees
11 ntil the notir·e of Aprwal µ;ivPn and filed under date of
.lannar~· :i. 1%1 approximate!~· fifteen months later, and
a!'tPr thP .iudµ;niPnt, insofar as it related to the delivery
nl' ilw deNls to th(• Administrator had been satisfied for
111ore than fourtern months.
~o

Thf· next matter of sig-nificance occurred in the pro-

hate procPeding on .January 8, 1960, when the Walker
Hank arnl Trust ( 'ompan~·, as administrator of the estate
rd' llillar<l L. \'oorhees, deceased, filed a Petition in the
l'ourt RPeking <·onfi rmation of sale of the property here
i11volved to Appt>llant Hanson, alleging that "on the 17th
da>· of DPrf•rnher, 19;)0 the following offer to purchase
tl1(• above lllPntioned real property has been submitted
to thP administrator as follows:

''Walker Bank & Trust Company, Administrator
Estate of Hillard L. Yoorhees, Deceased
f:ialt LakP City Ftah

..

\Ve, the urnlersiµ:ned, Hanson Land and Livestock
Company. of Salt Lake Cifr
. ' Utah ' herebv. offer to
pnrehasP all of thP Yoorhees Estate interest in
arnl to the grazing lands situated in Sevier County,
Ptah, ('011,.;isting flf approximately 2800 acres, for
a ron,.;idPrntion of $15.50 per acre, together with
grazing p('l'lllits for 1810 head of sheep in the
~Iilfonl l nit No. 9, District No. 3, at $10.00 per
lwad. \r< lmvP l1Pretofore deposited the sum of
$lO,OIHl.Oll as a (lown payment on this offer and
Wt· 11!.',Tf«· h) pa:· t lit' balance of the purchase price
1

1
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following confirmation by the probate romt,
follows:

10 equal annual instalJrnents, the first of whir·'
shall be payable w_ithi_n 30 days following 111,
<late an order eonf irmmg sale, plus interest:
date, is entered by the probate court at Mant
Utah and l/lOth thereof annualJy thereafter 1,
and including a final payment to become due i~
the year 1969, plus intereRt at the rate of l'
from October 21, 1958, the date the undersig11P1:
company took possession of said lands unde1 ,
previous agreement with Mrs. Pearl 0. Voorhee)
widow of Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased, anJ
former Administratrix of hi8 estate, to the datt
of confirmation and 5% per annum interest on
the unpaid balance from the date of confirmation.
It is understood and agreed that the exact acreage
involved in this offer is to he subsequently detrr
mined and the price of $15.50 per acre will app1·,
to only such acreage as the estate shall he in po11.
tion to convey.
\Vithin a period of 6 months from thr date tlw
sale is confirmed by the probate court, an abstratl
of title is to be furnished us covering all of tnP
grazing land included in this offer.
Seller is to reserve all mineral rights in the land;
conveyed to the purchaser if the sale is confirmea
by the court.
HANSON LAND AND LIVESTOCK
COMPANY,
a Corporation
By G. Aaron Hanson
Its President"
On the same day, Hespon<lent:;; herein filed a Pe·
tition for a Partial Distribution fo them of the ~aiw
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propPrt>·· a ll<>g-ing that all claims against the estate,
illlif'ritanrP tax0:-: is payahlt•, and all debts of the estate
havr lwen fnll:· paid, satisfied and discharged so that
tlw estate was in t hf• po~ition to have distribution made
nnrl that Petitimwr soup;ht to have distributed to them
t!Jr real propPrt:- in question in accordance with the
provisionf-; of St>1··t ions 7:5-12-:l and 7;5-12-6, UCA 1953.
Pditimwrs agrred, in rxf•hange for said property so
distrihuti-~d to them, to deposit with the administrator
of the f'state the appraised value of the property so that
sueh proceeds could he included in the trust in lieu of
1he property . ( R. 300-303). Both Petitions were set down
for hearing at the same time and due notice thereof
g-iYen to all interestf>d parties including Appellant Hanreril

~~on.

(R. 296,305 ).

Thereafter. Respondents filed objections and protf'st to the petition of the Walker Bank and Trust Company, stating tl1at the protestants had already petitioned
thr Court to have cfo..;tributed to them said real property
in question as a part of tlwir distributive share and that
prntcstants were 0ntitled to said property as heirs of
said Hillard L. YoorhePs, deceased. (R. 318-320). Likewise, Appellant Hanson filed a Petition in said probate
matter "for eonfirma ti on of the sale" of the real propert:-· to it and protestf'd the granting of Respondents'
J1<'tition for partial distrihution. (R. 321-326). Appellant
\' oorhees filt>(l no written objectionR to either of the
pditions.
Prior to the hearing on these petitions the Administrntor filf'<l a petition to ronfirm the sale of other proper-
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ty received by it from Appellant \'oorh<'es to third
persons. No objections to this petition were filed hy arl\
of the parties. All of the petitions, including the petitions of the Administrator, the petition of Hespondent~
and the petition of Appellant Hanson came on for heariiw
before the Court on February l, 19GO, all parties bei 11 ",,,,
present and represented by coum;el. 'l1he court first heard
the petition of the Administrator to sell both real and
personal property not here involved and, no protr.sts being made, confirmed said sales. (R. 328-:)31). After
hearing evidence on the other matters the Court made
the following ruling from the Bench:
"The Court denies confirmation of the sale
or any sale upon the petition or th0 hid of Mr.
\Vinch. I grant a partial distribution. The decree
for a partial distribution may provide that there
be set over to these daughters, to these heirs an
undivided two thirds interest in the property that
is sought to be transferred by this sale, and I have
a number of reasons for that that I don't think I
need to express. One of them, the girls want it.
There is no debt. They can deal with it as the)'
like. The other one is ~Irs. Vorrhees has already
dealt with Mr. Hanson with respect to the matter.
Perhaps she is bound with respect to her interest.
This leaves it so that the parties can adjust it the
wav
mav
an order.
. thev. want to ' and YOU
.
. draw
1
Mr. Nielsen. Court is in recess.'' ('1 1'. FPh. 1, 1
6(), 67)

1
•

Thereafter, on February lG, 19fi0, the administrator
filed a further petition asking for partial distribution l''
the widow of the other one-third interPst in and to thl'
same real property. (R. 337-3-tl). Notice of the hearin~
of this petition was given to all parties and no protrsti
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11 ·en~ filed. by anyone. (H. 3+3). At the same time, how-

,,wr, a pet it ion was filed by Hespondents requesting distribution to thPlll of the two-thirds interest of the estate
in anJ to tlw property id,·ntifie<l as the "Taylor Grazing
Pi·nnit for t Jtp gra;i;ing of 1,870 head of sheep on the .Milford Unit No.!:!, District No. :v' owned by decedent during
i lif....ti1rn~. ( H. :H7-350). This petition was filed .March
-t. 19GU and l'ame on for hearing at the same time.as the
prtition of the administrator for distribution to the Appellant Voorhees of the remaining one-third interest in
and to the real property. Notice of this petition was likewi::;e g-iven to all parties in question and objections to the
pPtition were filed b~- Appellant Voorhees and Appellant
1 \,:

llnm~on.

The Hearing was lteld on the 28th of l\Iarch, 1960, as
~liown by the appropriate .Minute Entry of the Court, at
\rliich time Appellant Y oorhees, through her attorney,
a~ked permission to withdraw the Petition for Partial
Distrihntion to lier of lier one-third interest in the real
property, which motion was granted. The Court then
wc>nt on to hear the evidence in respect to the petition of
HP~pondents for partial distribution to them of the twotl1i rds interest in the grazing permit and thereafter deterlllined that such petition should be granted. Since a
transnipt of the proceedings of March 28th is not before
tii(' Court, it must he assumed that the order of the Court
i." amply supported hy the evidence.
Hdore tl1e adual Findings of Fact and Conclusion8
<ii La"' and .1 udgrn<'nt of the Court on the several petit J.,i:~ ···nild IH· pn'p~nPd, it was necessary to obtain a de-
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tailed abstract of the lands in question so that the eoili
plete legal description could be checked and corrected.
This was done, and subsequently on October 13, 1960 tlif'
Court entered formal ~_,,indings of F'act and Conclnsion~
of Law and Judgment on all the petitions. (R. 430-445).
Motions to vacate the judgments and for a new trial
were filed by Appellant Voorhees and Appellant Hanson
as well as Objections to the Findings of Fact and a mo-'
tion to amend the same. (R. 451-464). Thereafter, the
Court heard the matters on December 5, 1960, and entered an order (as shown in the Minute Entry) denying
the motions. This appeal was then taken on January 3,
1961.
Respondents regret that it has been necessary tu
set forth the facts in such detail. However, it is very esential that the Court have a full and accurate knowledge
of all the pertinent facts to avoid any quesion or confusion which might rise from a lack of understanding of
what has taken place.
For this reason Respondents feel it necessary also
to correct some impressions or conclusions which appear
in Appellants' statements of fact.
At page 2 of her Brief Appellant Voorhees sta:e~
that the dispute necessitating this appeal involves a claun
L\· the <laughters that land and property deeded to tlw
n~other should be placed in trust and protected for h~r
ultimate use and benefit. This is not the issue in :lw
. goJ11~
case. The issue is whether Appellant Hanson is
fnr
to get the property through Appellant Yoorhees

19
$1;).00 pP-r aere or whether the other heirs (Respondents)
1.a 11 etaim their <fo•tributive shares of two-thirds interest
tL(•rein at a value of $15.50 per acre. As Mrs. Yoorhees
tt--stified in the hearing on February 1, 1960, she objected
to a partial <fo,tribution of the land to Respondents "beeause if we l1ave a partial distribution this land is going
l •J haVf'. to he partitioned and this partial [partition] suit
1:1ay las1 a year, two years or even three."
~he

further testified:

"THE COURT: Well your objection is then
as I understand it that without a sale of this
property the trust can't be completed.

··A. rrhat's right.
"THl~

COURT: That is your objection.

"A. Yes, sir, and I cannot see.
"THE COURT: That is your objection.
Have you got any other objection?

.. A. No, only that I didn't put it in to be partially distributed. I put it in to be sold." (Tr.
Feb. 1, p. 18)

1\lr. Hanson well knew when he attended the hearing
for confirmation of sale of the property to Appellant
llanson that if the property were sold the court would
put it up to public bidding in court.

".l\lR. WATSON: l\Ir. Hanson, you have been
told hy your counsel several times if there is a
sah~ of this land that there will have to be an opportunity for bids in open court, haven't you¥
"A. Yes, sir.
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''.~R. WATSON: You were also told by the
Adnumstrator and myself were you not 1

''A. Yes, sir." (Tr. Feb. 1, p. 48)
On page 6 of the same Brief appears the statement
that Respondents originally filed a petition in the distriet
court "to compel delivery of the estate pro pert r thei
alleged was wrongfully withheld". This statement. iR 8j,;_
0
nificant in the light of the subsequent argument by Appellants that failure of the Court (on the hearing of October 21st and December 16th, 1957) to compel delivery of
the property at that time "constituted a determination of
the facts". (See, Argument, p. 16) The petition filed by
Hespondents and which was heard by the Court on Oct11her 218t and December 16th, 1957 (prior to the fonne1
appeal in this matter) did not request the Court to compel delivery of the estate property wrongfully held h:·
Appellant Voorhees. The petition requested that Appllant Vorhees be required to appear and submit to an
examination, under oath, concerning property which she
may have and to bring with the records and other documents with respect to her alleged ownership; but no reqneRt was made in that petition or in that hearing that
Appellant Yoorhees be required to turn over to the estate
the property which Respondents claimed belonged to tlw
estate. (R. 30). Again on page 7 Appellant Voorhees
states that at the trial of the civil matter on April 1, 1959.
the parties requested the Court to continue the matter
''to give an opportunity to reach agreement". That ~as
not the Rtatement of counsel or the basis for the eontJnnance of the case. The agreement had been reached between the partit>s, but it was intended that a formal stip·
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ulation lw 1·nten~d for judgment after Appellant Voor1,t·P>' !ind renden·d lter accounting for all property and
a:-:;-;rt.-; ''Ji id1 Ii(· longed to tlw estate. It being impossible
for tl1t· parties thereafter to settle the accounting, the
11iattP1 had to lw lu. . ard by the Court and judgment enter"d on (ktoher :2, HJ;)~. (Tr. April 1, p. 1,2)
Tlw judgrnent not only settled all matters of account11w lwtwer·n the parties, but also determined that the
prn1wrty here involved be conveyed by warranty deed to
the estate, which was voluntarily done by Appellant
\"oorhees.
Again, at page 11 of Appellant Voorhees' Brief appears the statement that in the hearing on February 1,
1960. sl1e ··testified that she intended to abide by her
agwernPnt with intervenor." That is not correct. Her
iP.--ti1JJnny as appears on page 23 of Transcript of Pro1 Pedings, ~~ebruary l, 1960 is to the effect that in her
opinion it would be to the best interest of the estate to
i1an tlie sale proposed by the Administrator to Appellant Hanson eonfirmed. (Tr. Feb. l, p. 23). However,
1lit• ('onrt l'onnd otherwise.
~~inally on page 2 of the brief of Appellant Hanson

a1 J1ears thP statement that the "l\Iemorandum of Underdarnling'' was not presented to the Court until August
~9. 19f)9. That is not the fact. As the Transcript of the
prneredings shows, the written l\femorandum was pre:-:entPd to thP Court at the time it was entered into and
'''llln'i('] stated that thPy would be "happy to furnish the
( 'omt \\itli a eom' for his examination," hut rounsel pre1
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ferred not to file it with the Court pending "the execution of the final formal stipulation and entry of judgment
therein''. (rl'r. April 1, p. 2)
No attempt was ever made to keep this .Memorandurn
from Appellant Hanson, who was advised through his
counsel immediately thereafter that it had been entered
into by the parties settling the legal action.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Appellants have set up three points which are discussed. Although they do not object to a discussion of
the points raised by Appellants, Respondents submit that
there is a preliminary problem which must be resolved
before this Court can review or consider the Judgment
entered on October 2, 1959. That proposition is whether
an appeal therefrom at this time is proper. For that
reason Respondents in their Brief will argue such matter first and then proceed to a discussion of Appellants'
points, as follows:
POINT I.
WILL AN APPEAL LIE AT THIS TIME FROM THE
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT ENTERED OCTOBER
2, 1959?
POINT II.
ARE THE DECREES OF DISTRIBUTION VOID FOR
WANT OF JURISDICTION?
POINT III.
IS THE JUDGMENT OF OCTOBER 2, 1959 SUPPORTED
BY THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING?
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POINT IV.
ARE THE FINDINGS OF FACT SUPPORTED BY THE

t.:VlVENCE OR DO THEY SHOW THAT APPELLANT WAS

\\'HONGFULLY DENIED THE RIGHT TO DEFEND HER

PROPERTY?

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
WILL AN APPEAL LIE AT THIS TIME FROM THE
.TuDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT ENTERED OCTOBER

2, 1959?

Although Appellant Voorhees has devoted most of
lier BriPf to a discussion of the judgment entered by
the lfo;trict Court in the civil action on October 2, 1959,
no eom5ideration has been given to the question whether
an appeal will lie from such judgment at this time. Re"lJOIHhmh; contend that no appeal can be taken at this
tim<>. This issue was first raised at the time of filing Respon<lf:lnts' motion to dismiss the appeal herein. Since
this Court apparently did not consider the merits of that
motion in regard to the timeliness of the appeal (no opinion having lwen rendered but a penalty being imposed
npon Appellants for failing to file the record on appeal
in time) Respondents again wish to point out to the
Court that the appeal from the judgment entered October
:!. J !-l:-i!J was not taken until January 3, 1961, fifteen
1nnnths afttir thP entry thereof.
This matter is specifically covered by the provisions
()f thp rtah HuleH of Civil Procedure. Rule 73(a) pro-

YidPs:
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"When an appeal is permitted from a }fo;trirt
Court to the Supreme Court, the time within
which an appeal may be taken shall he one montli
from the entry of judgment appealed from unle~s
a shorter time is provided by law".
Although there are certain exceptions provided for
such as where a motion for a new trial is pending, nr:
su<>h exception has any application in the instant case.
N" o motion for a new trial or other motion was filed in
either the civil or probate matters in respect to that judgment following its entry on October 2, 1959, until the
notice of appeal was filed on .T anuary 3, 1961.
It is expected that Appellant Voorhees will contend
that the judgment appealed from is not a final judgment,
hut is interlocutory in nature because the Court retained
jurisdiction over this cause to adjudicate any matter
·which may arise under the Memorandum pending tlw
final creation of the trust provided therein and in the
fnrther probate proceedings herein. (Civil R, 41)

Hespondents contend that the judgment entered wa~
a final ;judgment for purpose of appeal, notwithstandin~
the Court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate additional
matters which might arise. See, Parsons v.s. Parsons, .1[J
l~t. (i0~. 122 Pac. 907; and Allred vs. Wood, 72 l't. ~~I.
:270 Pae. 1089; (where the Court held that an intnloen·
tor>- decree of divoree is final for purposes of appeal.I
r;29 , r~
Pac·
f.lee, abo, Jn re A11er1Jllch's Estate, 23 Ut. u'
JJ
-1-88, (wlwre the Court analyzed what is a final jndgnwnt
for pnrposes of appeal in a probate matter_)
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Ir,

(·nr, it rn answered that the judgment was
, 1,'1 ;1 fimtl ,judg·11w11t for purposes of appeal, no appeal
1,, noper ~im·(• an appeal may be taken a::; a matter of
1
riglll 011/.11 fro111 final ,judgments. (Rule 72(a) URCP)
li1111

( Jf eourse, under certain provisions an appeal may

tahn from interlocutory orders. This matter is cov"'' d h\ the provisions of Rule 72(b) which provides that
:1 1wtit :on may be made to permit an intermediate appeal
! r1>1J1 an iuterlocutory order or determination. Even
lirre, ltm\·ever, the rule specifically ::;tates that the petition
l"Jr sul'h intermediate appeal must be filed "'vithin the
time required for filing a notice of appeal under Rule 73
1n) ''_ Heganlle::;s of whether the judgment of October 2,
1!J;)!), i~: trPated as interlocutory in nature or as a final
,pidgrnent, no appeal therefrom will lie unless taken within 1111(· montl1 from its entry.
II\'

Tla• time prescribed by this rule for taking an appeal
t'rolll is jurisdictional. (See, Allen v.s. Garner, 45 Ut. 39,

I-kl Pae. 228: SorPnson Vii. K orsgaard, 83 Ut. 177, 27
f>a<·. :!d -1-:m). The above case::; were decided by the Su:1rt-111<· Court prior to the adoption of the Rules. Howf·\·er, tlie sarne principle has been applied since the adoption of tl1e l' tah Rnles of Civil Procedure. (See, 1 n re.
l,.11;1rl1's RstafP, 123 Pt. 57, 254 Pac. 2d, 454.)

111 the> Lyn('h ease a p<~tition was filed in a probate
Jll' 0 <'et>ding requesting an order directing the executrix
••f tlw e:-.;1at(~ spe<·ifically to 1wrform a contraet with petiti(Jnpr. f-l11<'li proceeding is very similar in nature to the
1
"•>1i(in \\ lii('Ji was filed by Respondents herein requesting
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the Court to enter judgment against the Appellant Vu 11 r
hees determining that the real property and other a 88 Pt~
in her possession belong to the estate and directing and
re<1uiring her to execute deeds in favor of the Adminis.
trator as agreed to in the Memorandum of Understanrling. The trial court in the Lynch case entered judgnwnt
in· favor of the petitioner and the executrix thereafter
within the time provided by the rules filed a motion to
amend the decree or to grant a new trial. This motion
was denied on November 22, 1952. Thereafter, on December 8, 1952, Appellant served on the Respondent a notice
of appeal but failed to file the same with the Court until
December 23rd. Respondent moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction claiming that the notice of
appeal was not filed within one month after the motion
to amernl was denied. This Court granted the motion to
dismiss because "the notice of appeal was not filed within
one month as required". See, also, Anderson vs. Ander.
son, 3 Ut. 2d 277, 282 Pac. 2d 845.
Another reason why the appeal from the judgment
of October 2, 1959, cannot be considered is that the judg·
ment in the particulars to which this appeal is directed
has been fully complied with and satisfied. The judg·
ment, among other things, ordered and directed Appel·
]ant Voorhees to execute and deliver to the Adminis·
trator (Walker Bank and Trust Company) "a warrant:
deed to that certain real property located in Sanpeti
• eal
Counfr, Utah, known as the 'farm' and that certain r ·
prope~ty located in Sevier County, Utah, known as tht
'mountain ground'". (Civil R, 40) Within a very shoM
time after the entry of this judgment Appellant Voorhee•
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and deliw·red to the Administrator the wariant.r deeJs refened to. She also delivered to the Ad1ninistrator all of the personal property ::;pecifically de·"crilll'd in the judgment and ordered to be turned over
ltl the .\dlllinistrator. rrhis wa::; done voluntarily and at
a ti11H'. wlH·n no motion or other proceeding was pending
tu atkmpt to hold her in contempt of Court for failing to
do so. She thereafter at no time filed a motion to set
a:-idl' the judgment or to obtain relief therefrom until this
;1ppf'al \\·as attempted. Even though Appellant Voorhees
was required under threat of punishment for contempt to
1·omply with other provisions of the judgment, no attempt
io appettl was made by her.
, \P1·u1~d

Respondents respectfully submit that there is no
rnore reason for claiming that the judgment of the Court
011 Oetober 2, 1959, is interlocutory in nature than there
is to 1·lairn that the judgments of partial distribution
l1erein appealed from are interlocutory in nature and
t l1erefore not ap1)ealable.
POINT II.
ARE THE DECREES OF DISTRIBUTION VOID FOR
WANT OF JURISDICTION?

We believe that little need he said concerning A.ppi,llant \'orl1ees' f'laim that the lower court had no jurisclil'tio11 1o enh•r the judgments of partial distribution, be<'HllsP the Adrninistrator had no title, or right of pos::;es~io11 in and to 1hP property in question. Obviously this
is not <·orred he('ause, as stated hereinbefore, Appellant
roodJP('S ('(Jl1\'{'~"1><l thf' property to the Administrator by
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warrant~' ded and such deeds were recorded. 8ince the

entry of the Judgment of October 2, 1959, Hai<l ,\ ppellanl
h~s approved the conduct of the Administrator in dealing
with the assets as part of the Estate, in selling the farm
land and other properties and has accepted and received
all of the benefits accruing to her therefrom. The onh
ohjeetion made at the hearing on February 1, 1960 wa~<
to the effect she wanted the "mountain ground" sold to
Appellant Hanson.
It is further claimed that the Court had no ,jurisdiction to enter the judgments because in the initial proceedings instituted by Respondents in 1957 to requin,
Appellant Yoorhees to appear and submit to examination
eoncerning the properties, no order was made requiring
her to turn said properties over to the estate. Although
this matter has been referred to above in the Statements
of Facts, Respondents again point out to the Court that
the petition requested only the right to an order of the
Court to examine Appellant Voorhees as to such property
and therefore the Court would had had no right to make
such an order unless the pleadings were amended so to
request.

Likewise, in the civil action prosecuted by Respondents against Appellant Voorhees, the latter raised no
question of res adjudicata or otherwise attempted to assert any prior adjudication. We submit that an,r sueli

asserted defense was and is impossible in the light 01
the prayer of the petition and the nature of the procet>di11g~<

themselves.
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POINT III.
IS THE JI lDGMENT OF OCTOBER 2, 1959 SUPPORTED
BY THE l'IIEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING?

,\otwith:-;tanding Respondents believe that no appeal
\\·ill lie at this time from the judgment of October 2, 1959,
i]1\'.' lee! requin·d to direct some attention to the matters
rai;-;Pd by Appellant Voorhees as to the suffiicency of the
\l1,111orandu1t1 of l ;nderstanding to support the judgment.
\t tlit> outset it 111ust be remembered that the findings,
:·011clusions, and ;judgment, recite that they are based up11n tl1e evidt-'nee au<luced at the hearings. rrhe l\Iemorandu111 of l'nderstamling was only a part of the evidence

Appellant Yoorhees treats the l\Iemorandum of Un<fprstauding entered into as a stipulation. A stipulation
i.~ dd'ined in ;>0 Am .•Jur. Stipulations, Sec. 2, p. 605, as
follows:
.. A stipulation ... in the sense in which the
term is used in this article, is an agreement, admission, or concession made in a judicial proceeding hy the parties therf'to or their atttorney, in reS}Ject to some matter incident thereto, for the
pmpose, ordinarily, of avoiding delay, trouble,
and t>xpense".

:i(I

\\'itli l'Pspeet to construction of stipulations, Sec. 8,
.\111 ..Jur. Stipulation:-;, 609, provides:
.. As a general rule, stipulations should receive
a fail' and lihPra] <>onstruction in harmony with
tlt~· apparent intention of the parties and the
,..:pirit or justiee, and in the furtherance of fair
trial upon the 11ierits, rather than a narrow and
t<>clmi"nl 01H' calenlated to defeat the purposes of
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their execution . . . A stipulation must be ,
strued in the light of the circumstances surro:~:
ing the parties and in view of the result which the
were attenwting ~o accomplis~:" ~nd again: ''O~
appeal a stipulation and the finding of the court
thereon s~ou.ld receive a construction with reference to ex1sting laws effectmg the subject matter.
l n case of d011bt, appellant courts strongly incline
tou;ard the construction adopted by the trial
court." (Emphasis added) (Ibid, p. 610)
\Vhere a stipulation has been entered "one of the
parties will not be allowed to withdraw from the agreement thus made without the consent of the other, except
by leave of court upon cause shown". lb~d, p. 611) In the
present instance Appellant Voorhees has never sought to
withdraw from the Memorandum of Understanding made
or to repudiate those portions thereof and of the judgment which inured to her benefit.
The findings disclose substantial credits were allowed her for family allowance and expenses. (Civil R.
34-37). Likewise, in the Memorandum of Understanding
the children guarantee that Mrs. Voorhees will receive
not less than $4200.00 per year, less any amount which
Hhe receives from social security so that since the entry
of the judgment:::; he has continued to receive from the
assets in the hands of the Administrator the sum oi
$350.00 per month less any amount received from social
seruritY. She has never relinquished her claim to thii
·
·
t.
of tht'
nmount and has never repudiated those por .ions
.
h" h appea r to be iii
~fernorandum of TTnderstan d mg w le
liPr favor.
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Jt is <'la11ued that counsel for Hespondents in open
,- 0 ul't at the hearing on August 29, 1959, stated that the
part ie~ \rt~re unable to reach an agreement. That is not
"onett. Counsel stated to the Court that ''a written
a!.!;n'eJJtent of 8ettlernent was made and entered into that
day m Court". \ rrr. Aug. 29, p. 1) Counsel further stated
t lint sinC'e the <lak of the settlement attempts had been
1nade to obtain eowpliance with the agreement which had
1;ee11 ummeee:-;sful, "so it was finally deemed necessary
that this matter he brought back to the Court for the
purpose' of having the judgment entered in order to obtain e01upliance". (Ibid., p. 1)
POINT IV.
ARE THE FINDINGS OF FACT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE OR DO THEY SHOW THAT APPELLANT WAS
\VRONGFULLY DENIED THE RIGHT TO DEFEND HER

PROPERTY?

Counsel for Appellant Voorhees states ''when the
Court gaw the .Mt>morandum of Understanding the quality ot evideneP an<l entered the judgment of October 2,
I~J59, the mother Jost her right to defend her title." Coun:-;e] should have stated that when the mother entered into
thf· MPmoran<lnm of Understanding on April 1, 1959, she
eoHrec}pc) that sllf~ had no right to claim she was entitled
to tile property in question.
lt is further argued that the findings of the trial
r·omt do not support the judgment of Partial Distribution. nor is the evidence sufficient to sustain the findings,
<·oiwln:-;ion" and judgment as to Partial Distribution.
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'l111e provision::; of the statute (Sec. i 5-12-j, Ll'.\
1953) pe.rmit partial distribution of the property of th.
estate u·ttho11t requiring full and complete distributio 111)1
the assets of the estate by the Court being ::;atisfied that
no one will be prejudiced by withholding parts of !hi
assets for distribution at a future time. Otherwise, it
would appear from the provisions of this statute that th~
Court should inunediately make a complete and total 1fa.
tribution upon the Administrator filing a report and finai
account.
The law specifically provides that the property 01
the decedent "both real and personal," passes to the heirf.
"subject to the control of the Court and to the possession
of any adminitrator appointed by the Court for the pur
poses of administration." (Sec. 74-4-2, UCA, 1953).
Sec. 74-4-3, UCA, 1953 further provides that one-thiru
in value of the legal or equitable estate in real propert1
possessed by the husband shall be set apart as the pru
perty of the wife if she survives him. Under the provi·
~.;ions of these two sections, this Court has previously helJ
that title to property passes immediately to the heiri
upon the death of the decedent, subject only to adminii·
tration and payment of debts. Chamberlain vs. Larso.".
83 lTt. 420, 29 Pac. 2d, 355; Jones vs. State Tax Comirmsio11, 99 Pt. 373, 104 Pac. 2d, 210.

In the instant matter a dispute arose between A:'
pell ant Y oorhees and Respondents as to whether the ~ea
.
, . art of tli
properfr and certam personal property was a P
..
.
l ti t•[\l
0state of Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased, an< ie
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wa:-; i1ro:-;e<'uted for the purpose of determining
1 iii:- qm·:-;t ion. rr'liat matter was re~rnlved when Appellant
,.(lorlweii agn•<•d to, and did eonvey, the property to the
··~rail· and have it administered as the part of the assets
11f tl1t• eiitatP. A report haii been made not only to the
11ohall' (·ourt that the property belonged to the estate,
1
hut aliio to the :--;tate rrax Commission and inheritance
taxl':-; have been paid thereon, all of which has been <lone
\\'iti1 tlw full knowledge, consent and approval of Appellant roorhPeii, and without objection on the part of Ap1wllant Hanson who was given notice of alJ petitions and
othPr motions filed. If, as Appellant Hanson now claims,
it i:-; P11titled to the property under its contract, it should
ltan petitioned the count to have the property or some
portion therPof set aside to it rather than seeking to buy
tl1e property from the Administrator and thereby ackno\\'ledging the latter's title.
:i:·tH•ll

ThP only claim which Appellant Hanson has or may
have to the property in question (after the entry of the
.indgment on Odo her 2, 1959) is to claim the right to the
11n(•-third interest of Appellant Voorhees as the surviving \\ ido\L Aetually steps were taken to make this claim
11·li(·n the Administrator at the instance of Appellant
\"nrhPPii t'ilPd a petition in the probate eourt seeking to
iiaw :-;et a:-;i(le to here her onf>-third interest in the real
prnpel'ty in (plPstion. (R. 3~~7-~~·H) How can Appellant
\'oorhePl'l on the one hand ask the Court to distribute to
!11 T one-third of the real property in question and object
1(\ thP Court distrihuting to the other two heirs the twothit'(l:- interest which they have in and to tne same propPry ! Although tlw record ha8 not been certified to this
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Court as to the proeeedings on March 28, 1960, foe MinutP
J<~ntry of the Court entered for that date indicates that
upon motion of counsel for Appellant Voorhees the pe.
tition for a partial distribution to her wa~ withdra\\Ti
''to be brought up at a later date".
V{ith regard to the evidence being sufficient to sup
port the findings, conclusions and judgment, the testi.
mony of Clair Mortenson, Trust Officer for Walker
Bank and Trust Company, as well as the records hefor~
the Court, clearly disclose that all of the conditions pre.
c-edent to partial distribution were satisfied as required
by Sec. 75-12-5. The only claim of Appellants now ap
parently is that there was no showing that it would hP for
the best interest of the beneficiaries of the estate beeamr·
of the fact that a higher price than that which was to ht
paid in by the daughters for inclusion in the trust could
lw obtained by selling the property. In the first place it
is not the perogative of the probate court to sell propert~
where not needed to pay the debts or claims against the
eHtate because the heirs are entitled to the property and
have title to it subject to administration. (Sec. 75-10-l.
TTCA, 1953) And the matter of determination as to
whether it is for the best interest of the estate is left tii
th ediscretion of the trial court. See, Nielson's Estate r·
Nielson, 107 Ut. 564, 155 Pac. 2d, 968 .
. h er b'd
s rna<lt
Appellants argue that because a h1g
i wa,
in Court for the sale of the property that it, thereforr
appears obvious that it would not be for the best inter~~t~
of the beneficiaries to distribute it. The trial court int
.
, hope thn'
mediately saw through tl11s
subter f uge an d "e
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do likewise. rrhe so-called bid of Appelinnt 1-lan;-;.011 for $18.00 per acre for the land involved and
.+ lfl.{)(I pt-1 H(')'t' for the permit rights was made "with the
lliHln;-;tanding that it is not prejudiced to the contract or
; 1111 1 iglit undPr tlw contract behveen Hanson Land and
L1\\•stock Company and Pearl 0. Voorhees." (Tr. Feb.
r iii" t '0111 t .·an

I. p. GOl

l 11<ln the contract between Appellant Voorhees and
_\ppellant Hanson which was before the trial court (R.
~~5-:251 ), it \\as agreed that Appellant Voorhees' interest
111 the property "could be decreed by the court in the
ahove action or the probate proceedings" to be all in0·lurl1,d within the estate of Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased,
and in 1rhich event ''the buyer would become entitled to
'>nly t11at portion of sales revenue from the sale of any
1 1i· all of th+> above described peroperty, included within
.-aid c:-:tate, in proportion to the total value of the said
•·:-:tatc h>ss any costs of administration and any federal or
''late inheritance taxes, which would be proportionately
i!PdudE:>d from any revenue from said property received
h~· the huy"r". f-;ince the agreement for the purchase of
11H· inten~t:>t ol' Appellant Voorhees in the property was at
tlic ratP of $15.00 per acre, Appellant Hanson would be
ntitl<>d to rf'eeive as the assignee of Appellant Voorhees
hi·:\• ;-;harp of any increment or increase which might have
11 • h\' 1nud or whi('h would he by the estate over and above
'tt 1d $J r>.110 rwr aere aR indicated in the above contract.
it '"a:-; for this n·ason that the Court in concluding to
rtn!Pr partial distribution stated that Appellant Yoorh;·e" had alrPady df'alt with Mr. Hanson with respect to
ft,,r inh•1 (·:-:t and "this would leave it so that the parties
1
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c~n deal with their respective interests as they may ch:
sire to do." (Tr. Feb. 1, p. 66-67)

1'here being no other claim that the evidence doe,,
not support the findings, conclusions and judgments of
the ·Court regarding the partial distribution, such judg.
rnents should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
mit:

By way of summary Respondents respectfully sub-

1. Any attempt to appeal from the judgment of
October 2, 1959 is untimely and the Court has no jurisdiction to hear or consider any matter with respect thereto.
2. In any event the judgment of October 2, 1959,
which was entered in both the civil and probate proceedings, was and is binding upon Appellant Voorhees and
Appellant Hanson Land and Livestock, they both having
had notice of the hearings out of which said judgment
arose and the judgment is not only a valid exercise of
the Court's power but binds and controls the partie~
thereto.
;1 The ground here in question constituting a part
of the estate of Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased, in accord·
ance with the l\Iemorandum of Understanding of the
parties and the judgment of the Court entered on Octo·
her 2, 1959 (as well as the warranty deed thereafter pi
· · t ra t or) ''iJn
cnted by Appellant Yoorhees to the A dm1ms
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i!t·in: arf' (•ntitled to a distribution to them in kind unless
uudt·r tlw provisiom; of Seeton 75-10-1, lJCA, 1953, sale
11 r tl1P property is necessary to pay the debts of the de('('dL·nt or expern"es and charges of administration or
\\'ould otlJ('rwise, in the discretion of the probate court,
11(' for t11e adYantage, benefit and best interests of the
( :-tate a!ld those interested therein. The probate court
!,;ffi11.~ d(•tennined that it would not be for the best interPl-'t of said estate that said property be sold, and further
r!t-tennining upon proof being submitted that all of the
dehts and expenses of the administration are paid and
a111ply provided for, its determination to enter an order
of partial distribution in accordance with the provisions
uf ~rdion 7f)-12-5, was and is in order and such judg11wnt s should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
NIELSEN, CONDER AND HANSEN
Arthur H. Nielsen
510 Newhouse Building
f;alt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondents

